Valparaiso University Law Review
Volume 17
Number 4 Symposium on Jurisprudential
Perspectives of Contract

pp.655-676

Symposium on Jurisprudential Perspectives of Contract

Ought We Keep Contracts Because They Are Promises
Páll Árdal

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Páll Árdal, Ought We Keep Contracts Because They Are Promises, 17 Val. U. L. Rev. 655 (1983).
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol17/iss4/3

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open
access by the Valparaiso University Law School at
ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized
administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information,
please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at
scholar@valpo.edu.

Árdal: Ought We Keep Contracts Because They Are Promises

OUGHT WE TO KEEP CONTRACTS

BECAUSE THEY ARE PROMISES?
PALL S. ARDAL*
INTRODUCTION ..............................................

655

THE NATURE OF PROMISE ..................................

657

THE OBLIGATION TO KEEP A PROMISE .......................

661

THE DIFFERENT NATURE OF CONTRACT .......................

665

IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL DECISIONS ..........................

672

INTRODUCTION

It is a widespread practice to define contracts as promises of a
certain sort. The following is typical: "A contract is a promise or a
set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy, or
the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as duty."1
It is. natural to infer from this kind of definition that reflection upon
the nature of promises, as these are understood by the layman outside a legal context, will be a reasonable first step towards an
understanding of contracts. This is, indeed, an assumption I shall
make, although we are told in a recent introduction to the law of
contract, immediately following the above definition, that "the, word
'promise' is being used in this definition, and in the whole law of
contract, in rather a special sense."' Thus, a cash sale in a shop is a
contract, whereas it may be held that, in making an ordinary promise, the promiser is binding himself to some future conduct..
Although this may not be quite correct, since one can promise
a present and a past fact (that something is or was the case), the important point is that English-speaking people, unacquainted with
special legal terminology, would not dream of saying that promises
are involved in a simple cash sale.' But, we are told, the artificiality
and oddity of this way of speaking is diminished when it is realized

* Charlton Professor of Philosophy, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario.
1. P. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 23 (1971). This is
the definition of the American Law Institute, RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONTRACTS. See A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS

5 (One Volume Edition, West 1952).

2. P. ATIYAH, supra note 1, at 23-24. I am not of course overlooking the further question-Upon which principles is it decided to enforce promises?
3. For further discussion of the inaccurate claim that all promises involve the
commitment to do a future deed see infra note 5.
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that, in this context, promise is used to mean contractualpromise.
Contracts are indeed promises, but not just any old promise will do;
only contractual promises qualify as candidates. How would you
identify a contractual promise? Well, it is not an ordinary promise,
but a promise that constitutes a contract. Fine logic, if you like
useless circular definitions. The fact of the matter is that many contracts, as described by lawyers, are peculiarly unlike ordinary promises. Of course, you can overcome this difficulty by claiming that
lawyers have a concept of promise all their own. But this cannot be
what legal theorists are intending when they say that contracts are
legally enforceable promises. P. S. Atiyah, from whose work I have
been quoing, sees nothing seriously wrong with this definition, although he does not consider it quite accurate, since, as most people
would readily agree, the law does not, literally speaking, force people to keep their contracts. In saying that contracts are legally enforceable promises, you cannot be using the word promise in a
special legal sense to mean contractual promise: if you did, your
claim would be purely tautological, and no room would be left for
promises that are not legally enforceable. This is fatal to the definition of a contract, for the definition purports to tell us how to
distinguish contracts from promises that are not contracts.
Charles Fried makes it abundantly clear that, in maintaining
that contracts are promises, he is not using promise in a special
legal sense. Fried claims that the moralist of duty, with whom he
agrees, "sees promising as a device that free, moral individuals have
fashioned on the premise of mutual trust, and which gathers its
moral force from that premise. The moralist of duty thus posits a
general obligation, of which the obligation of contract will be only a
special case-that special case in which certain promises have obtained legal as well as moral force. But since a contract is first of all
a promise, the contract must be kept since a promise must be
kept."4
Sometimes concepts are so severely modified to save a definition that they become useless. I want to explore the possibility that
this may have happened in the characterization of contracts as
promises. I shall also argue that there is no moral obligation to keep
promises as such, and that an obligation to keep contracts can consequently not be founded on the obligation to keep promises. We must
always seek the source of the moral obligation to keep promises and
contracts in other values than the mere fact that a promise was
made or a contract struck.
4.

C.

FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE
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THE NATURE OF PROMISE

The first task must be to examine the nature of promises in
non-legal contexts, in order to see how far this concept of a promise
can help to throw light upon the nature ot legal contracts. It must
be stressed that promises are essentially statements, although some
philosophers have explicitly denied this. The mistake these
philosophers made was to think that since to promise was to perform a speech act, and since this act seemed to be the act of committing oneself to doing something, this ruled out the possibility that
promises were statements.5 Is it not absurd to suggest that when a
person says, "I promise to return your book tomorrow," he can be
asked, "Is that true?" Does this not clearly reveal that, although in
promising you are committing yourself to doing something, you are
not making statements? But, although it may seem absurd to suggest that "to return your book tomorrow" may be true or false, this
is a philosophically unimportant accident of language. The same
promise can be made by saying, "I shall return your book
tomorrow" and then adding, "and that is a promise," or, "You can
count on it.". "I shall return your book tomorrow," seems to be a
statement and, "I shall return your book tomorrow and I shall not
return your book tomorrow," is plainly self-contradictory. The selfcontradictory character of, "I promise to return your book tomorrow, but I shall not return your book tomorrow," is only thinly veiled
by the structure of the English language.
In committing yourself to doing something, you are committing
yourself to the truth of the proposition that you will do what you
are promising to do. Unless the statement that you will do what you
promised to do turns out to be true, you have not kept your promise. This is sometimes obscured by the claim that promises are
statements about the speaker's intention. This does, I believe, intro5. Harrison, Knowing and Promising, MIND N.S. Vol. LXXI (1962). My own
criticism of this view in, And That's A Promise, 18 PHIL. Q. (July 1968). Atiyah, in his
PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW charges many philosophers (unnamed) with the error of insisting that promises are not statements and that one cannot promise facts. P. ATIYAH,
PROMISES, MORALS AND LAW 162 (1981). In my And That's A Promise, I stressed that
promises are essentially statements and distinguished salesman's promises, that
guarantee the nature of something, from what I called ordinary promises, i.e., promises to do something. A. D. Woozley (Promises,Promises, 90 MIND (April 1981) in commenting upon Atiyah's discussion note (88 MIND 351) rightly takes Atiyah to task for
failing to see the important difference between promising to see to it that something is
done and promising that something is the case, or will be the case, that is not in one's
power. Philosophers as a group are repeatedly represented by Atiyah as unable to see
this, that and the other. These charges are frequently not substantiated by him.
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duce a confusion into the discussion of this point by Fried, who, in
discussing the wrongness of lying and breaking promises, writes:
"When I speak falsely I commit myself to the truth of my utterance,
but when I promise falsely I commit myself to act, later. Although
these two wrongs are thus quite distinct there has been a persistent
tendency to run them together by treating a false promise as a lie
after all; a lie about one's intention."' But, in promising to do
something, you are not just making a statement of your present intention, you are saying that you are in the future going to do
something. Only if that statement about the future turns out to be
true, will it be correct to say of you that you kept your promise.
It is absurd to present as the only two alternatives, that the
promise either is a statement about the promiser's intention at the
time the statement is made, or it is not a statement at all, but a
commitment. It is a commitment, indeed, but one that is necessarily
made by making statements to the effect that you are going to do
what you are promising. This becomes obvious if you ask yourself
what the promisee is interested in. He is clearly, generally speaking,
not so much interested in the present sincerity of the promiser as
he is in his future deed. He may even trust a deceitful promise and
confidently base his actions upon the belief that the lying promiser
will turn out to be as good as his word. The promisee may base his
confidence upon the belief that the promiser will have second
thoughts about the moral propriety of deceit in this case: he may be
confident that further reflection, or forthcoming further information,
will convince the promiser that breaking the promise would be immoral or imprudent. I say "breaking the promise" for false promises
are clearly promises, a point that Fried appears to have forgotten
when he writes: "Promising is more than just truthfully reporting
my present intentions, for I may be free to change my mind, as I am
not free to break my promise."' This seems to rule out false promises. Could it be that lawyers' talk about the meeting of minds in
dealing with contracts is here casting such a deep shadow that we
are prevented from seeing clearly that sincerity is not a necessary
condition for making promises? There may be a similar reason why
Atiyah slips into talk about unexpressed promises, although in other
places he seems to appreciate the fact that promises are of necessity
symbolic communications. All threats must likewise be overt, though
only verbal threats are symbolic expressions. But, as we shall see
6. C. FRIED, supra note 4, at 9.
7. I& In the paragraph preceding the one from which I have quoted Fried
shows that he realizes the need to make room for false promises.
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later, the concept of a threat differs in other important respects
from the concept of a promise. The following quotation from Atiyah
seems to be quite absurd. Having made the observation that promises and threats are normally made "because a promiser wants
something," Atiyah goes on as follows: "But it is possible to make
promises or threats which do not seek to induce conduct, though it
is hard to conceive any reason for communicating a promise or
threat unless it is at least intended to induce expectations, pleasant
or unpleasant."8
It is not just difficult, but conceptually impossible to make a
promise and keep it to oneself, except in the special sense in which
we talk about making promises to oneself. Just imagine an
employee, who wants to be promised a raise at the end of the year,
being met with the response from the employer that such a promise
had already been made, only it had not been communicated. It is
even more obvious that one cannot make a verbal threat, and not
express it. Could the prosecution in a murder trial meet the claim
that the accused did not threaten the victim by saying that the
threats were of the uncommunicated variety, the accused just kept
his threats to himself?
I have been stressing that promises are overt symbolic acts,
and that to promise is necessarily to commit oneself to the truth of
a statement, as well as to the doing of a deed. But making true
statements is not the only way in which one person conveys information to another, nor is making false statements the only way in
which people can be deceived. Thus, someone may be depending
upon my being at home because I told him that I would be. This
could constitute a promise in the appropriate circumstances. But, I
may also have behaved in such a way as to lead him to believe that I
am at home without any verbal or other symbolic communication.
When I do this it cannot constitute a promise. One may also count as
a promise the emphatic invitation to the promisee to depend on
one's word about a present occurrence or to rely on something being
the case. Statements such as, "This machine is in perfect working
order, I promise you," are frequently heard. Although I grant that
one may promise present facts, I shall in what follows sometimes
write as if promises essentially relate to the future. When a promise
is made, people have a right to expect the promiser to intend to do
what he promises to do or, indeed, not to do. A promise is not just a
statement that one intends; it is, I repeat, an assertion that one will
do the promised deed.
8.

P. ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 157.
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I have already mentioned that making true statements is not
the only way in which information is conveyed. Thus, I can induce
the belief that I am at home, in my absence, by having the lights
switch on and off automatically, cancelling the delivery of the morning paper, etc. But deception based upon the use of natural signs
alone cannot be described as a false promise. If you take making
statements to be a linguistic act, it must be realized that this concept has to be understood broadly- so as to include nods and headshakings when these are made to do duty for language. Promises
can be made by the use of a variety of codes, some of which may be
adopted for use on a special occasion only. The code may be intelligible only to the promiser and the promisee.
When one has seen that promises are essentially categorical
assertions, the next question to ask is, "What is distinctive about
them?" I suggest that they differ from mere predictions and
representations in that they specially invite complete reliance, or
entitle the promisee (and sometimes also others, to whom the promise becomes known) to expect what is promised with complete confidence. But it may be argued that this is also true of emphatic verbal threats. There is nothing odd about putting up a sign reading
"Trespassers will be prosecuted! This is not just a threat, it is a
promise." Unlike mere vague verbal threats, promises make a
categorical assertion that something is the case, will be done, or will
be the case. This is true even of conditional promises. They assert
that if something is done (or is the case, or will be the case)
something else without a doubt will be done or will be the case.
Usually an emphatic verbal threat, like other threats, would be
taken to promise something evil or unwelcome to those to whom the
threat is addressed, even when the threat is made for the benefit of
the threatened person. Promises are taken to be different, in that
what is promised is considered to be welcome to the promisee. I put
it in this way because threats as well as promises may benefit the
threatened person. However, he would not consider himself to have
been threatened, unless he found the proposed act somehow unattractive. He may of course realize that what looked to him like a
threat was meant as a favour, and that the promiser would for that
reason think of himself as making a promise and not as making a
threat. What is meant as a promise can be taken as a threat and
vice versa. But notice that when a verbal threat is made in such a
way as to invite the threatened person to count completely on the
threat being carried out, it becomes entirely natural to characterize
the threat as a promise. The basic characteristic of all promises is
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that they are symbolic acts that involve a complete commitment to
the realization or the reality of what is promised.
THE OBLIGATION TO KEEP A PROMISE

It may, of course, be no less immoral to mislead people by the
use of natural signs than by the use of symbols. In the following two
cases one may feel that there is little to choose between the immorality displayed, but in only one of the cases can the immorality
be characterized as the breaking of a promise.' Case 1. A has an
automobile accident and is sufficiently injured not to be able to get
to the nearest telephone to call for help. An acquaintance, B, on approaching in his car, slows down and clearly sees A's predicament,
but A does not manage to shout to him. It is obvious to A that B is
fully aware of the situation and, believing him to be a kind person,
his mind is now at ease, since he banks on B's going for help. Case 2.
The second case is like the first except that A manages to shout to
B, "Will you call for help?" And B answers, "Sure," or, "It's a promise," or "Count on it," or simply, "Don't worry." B is in no hurry and
calling for help costs him nothing.
If he does not seek help, B's immorality is not very significantly
different in these two cases, though only in Case 2 does it consist in
the breaking of a promise. If there is a difference it lies in this: in
Case 2 the injured person is given greater assurance that help will
be obtained by B. This may lead A to depend upon this to his disadvantage. He might, for example, not attempt to obtain help from a
subsequent driver passing. But, this involves no difficulty for the
analysis I am proposing, since it is precisely this kind of consequence that, on my view, makes the keeping of a promise obligatory.
We can say the obligation was created by a promise in the second
case, because only in that case was a symbolic act performed by the
promiser. B plainly acquired an obligation in Case 1 because of his
discovery of the accident and his knowledge that A must be depending upon him to call for help, but it would be entirely incorrect to
claim that he promised to do this.
Discovering what is distinctive about promises reveals that
there is no prima facie moral obligation to keep them in a wellestablished meaning of that expression. Whether or not it is morally
9. Ardal, Promises and Reliance, 15 DIALOGUE 54-61 (March 1976), and MacCormick, Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers, Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Soc'y, Suppl. at 79 (1972).
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obligatory to keep a promise depends entirely upon the content of
the promise and the interest of the parties concerned in performance or non-performance. By "the parties concerned" I do not mean
to limit myself to the promiser and the promisee. A promise may
well affect the interests of third parties, including what we may
vaguely call the general public. The view that I am advocating is not
to be construed as naively utilitarian, for the interests that can be
brought to bear on the issue may involve questions of fairness as
well as quantities of welfare or utility. My view is thus consequentialist though not utilitarian.
But what I am advocating may still seem to be obviously wrong,
for the attack on the utilitarian view about the obligation to keep
promises has sometimes taken the form of objecting to the consequentialist aspect of this doctrine. The obligation to keep a promise
is, it has been claimed, based upon the past act of promising and not
upon the consequences of that act. What makes promises particularly
embarrassing for the utilitarian has been taken to be the alleged
fact that promises are in their essential nature formulae, or expressions, for placing oneself under an obligation. Thus, Sir David Ross
took promise-keeping to be a typical example of what he called a
prima facie duty.'" Such a duty became a real or actual duty, if not
overridden by a prima facie duty of greater stringency. This means
that when you promise to do an immoral deed you inevitably place
yourself under some moral obligation to do it. If you have another
prima facie duty that clashes with it there would always be some
conflict of duties. A similar view has been advanced more recently
by A. R. Grice who writes that "The proposition that A promised to
X implies that A has an obligation to X if he can."" He characterizes
the relation between what he calls abstract obligation and actual
obligation as follows:
"A has an abstract obligation to actions of the class X"
and
"A can do an individual action X falling under that class"
and
"X does not also fall under any class of actions by virtue
of which A has an abstract obligation not to do it implies
1
A has an actual obligation to do X."' 1
10.

11.
12.

W. DAVID Ross, FOUNDATIONS OF ETHICS (1939), particularly, Ch. 5.
G. GRICE. THE GROUNDS OF MORAL JUDGMENTS 46 (1967).
Id. at 44.
SIR
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To every abstract obligation there is a corresponding abstract
right. We are told that whenever it is the case that A has an
abstract obligation to do X there is a reason for his doing it "better
than any in terms of his independent interests." 3 Grice then goes
on: "If the abstract obligation is to do something immoral there is a
better reason still for his not doing it. But still his reason for doing
it is better than any in terms of his independent interests for doing
anything. Thus, instead of looking after the night watchman while
his companion cracks the safe, he [the robber] following his inclination, consorts with a lingering female, he has acted against better
reason. And when he later visits his confederate in prison to
apologize, the bitter recriminations which he receives are fully
justified.""
This account is, I believe, confused. Assuming that the criminal
act is immoral, there is no moral obligation of an abstract kind to
keep the promise to perform it; and the promisee has no moral right
at all to criticize the promiser. This can be more clearly seen if you
take a crime that is more obviously immoral than robbery without
violence. The promiser promises to shoot the guard if necessary to
prevent him from shouting for help. He finds that he cannot do it because he concludes that the deed would be immoral. He clearly
would not have a conflict of duties. In a case in which he may believe the promisee did not realize that he was expecting the promiser to do something immoral, the promiser may have another duty
resulting from the promise, and this may be confusing the thinkers
that I am criticizing. This other duty would consist in minimizing
the hurt to the promisee. One feels this obligation would tend to
disappear if the promisee was morally unjustified in accepting the
promise, and knew it. Of course there is another sense of "right"
that may here be confused with a moral right. The moral promisee
may have had a right based on good evidence for his confidence in
the promiser's promise. The promiser may always have been reliable
in the past, and there is thus a clear sense in which the promisee
may have every right to expect him to cooperate this time. But
though the promisee is naturally disappointed, the promiser had no
morally acceptable reason for doing the promised deed, and moral
recriminations for failing to keep the promise are therefore entirely
out of place.
It is sometimes thought that all ordinary informal promises are
such that, unless it is impossible to keep them, or the obligation is
13.
14.

Id at 85.
Id.
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overridden by a stronger obligation, the obligation remains and the
promisee has a perfect moral right to claim performance, if the
promisee has not absolved the promiser from the obligation. Again,
I think this is wrong. Let us take the case of lovers who promise to
be sexually faithful. The time comes when neither could care less
about the sex life of the other. That knowledge alone seems to me to
dissolve the moral obligation entirely. Notice that I'm not claiming
that the couple can't absolve each other from the obligation. I am
making the stronger claim that neither party has a right to insist on
holding the other to the promise. If one of the parties had become
uninterested in faithfulness because of total loss of interest in sex,
she/he would have had no moral justification for holding the other to
the promise, should he/she be in a position to do so. Of course, some
people may insist that the promiser had handed over to the promisee the right to decide whether the promised act should or should
not be done. But to think thus, is to fall into the trap of allowing
oneself to be governed by a general rule that leads to morally unacceptable results.
The inference from the occurrence of a promise to an obligation
to do what is promised is broken-backed from the start; there is no
presumption in favour of the conclusion that one should carry out
threats. It is only when the promise seems to be beneficial that one
has a reason to believe that, all things being equal, a promise ought
to be kept. To see the source of the obligation to keep promises in
the obligation to carry out vows is unacceptable for the same
reason. Not all vows are morally acceptable. Vows can be made to
carry out treats as well as to honour promises. Although it may
sometimes be morally obligatory to be as good as one's word in such
circumstances, it is clearly not always or even usually so.
Although there is no limit (except logical impossibility) to what
can be promised, power is needed to carry out promises. Promises
are not taken seriously when made by people believed not to be in a
position to honour their word. The power to keep promises, and thus
to have" promises accepted, can be used for good or for evil. It is, of
course, true that promises may help to further cooperation. But insofar as they are made to particular people, they may be used to
serve the interests of these people and may not at all be for the
benefit of the general public. It is easy to imagine an oppressive
society in which the oppressors are the only people who have
something to gain from making promises to each other, the oppressed
citizens not having sufficient liberty to be in a position to make
promises of any consequence. In such a society there would not be a
general moral obligation to keep promises. To show that the prac-
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tice of promising serves efficiency is not to justify it morally, for efficiency is not a moral value.
The principle of freedom of contract (legally binding promises,
on the theory under discussion) can be used as an oppressive tool.
Thus, H. L. A. Hart points out how the Supreme Court of the United
States "ruled unconstitutional, under the due-process clause, social
and economic welfare legislation of every sort, statutes fixing maximum hours, price controls, and much else."15 Thus, minimum wages
for women and maximum hours of work for bakers could not be fixed
by law because such limitation upon the freedom of contract was
deemed unconstitutional. No wonder the critics charged an attempt
to ". . . erect a Magna Carta for big business."'" Thus, to assess
whether the making and keeping of promises is desirable, one needs
to know the setting of this practice and what purposes it serves. It
is only appropriate to talk about "the sacred obligation to keep
promises" if it is presupposed that these promises are not used to
serve ethically unacceptable ends. One must reject the claim Fried
appears to make, that there is a general principle of a moral kind
that promises ought to be kept, from which one can deduce the
obligation to keep them in particular cases.
THE DIFFERENT NATURE OF CONTRACT

If it is untrue that all promises serve socially acceptable ends,
it seems less than surprising that "no legal system has ever enforced
all promises and no legal system ever will."'" However, the
significance of this claim lies in the fact that many morally unobjectionable promises are not legally enforceable, nor would it be in the
public's interest to enforce them. But before I say something about
the difficulties of using principles such as consideration to mark off
contracts as legally enforceable promises, more needs to be said
about the way in which the concept of a promise would have to be
modified if the thesis that contracts are promises is to be saved. If
my account is correct, that promises are overt symbolic acts, there
do not seem to be any promises involved in cash sales-although, as
we have seen, these are talked of as contracts. Similarly, to board a
bus is taken to involve entering a contractual relation, and no promises seem to be exchanged. However, we are told a promise is there,
15. H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The
Nightmare and the Noble Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 972 (1977).
16. Id.
17. Reiter, Courts, Considerationand Common Sense, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 439
(1977).
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but that it is an implied promise. The same is taken to be true of
vending machines. But, in neither case need anything be said, and
one can understand Atiyah when he suggests that it is because people in cases of this kind are ". . . bound by an obligation that we
generally feel impelled to imply a promise."18 But this impulse
should be resisted, for there is no reason why an obligation should
not be imposed upon people by what is tacitly understood. Only a
misinterpretation of the nature of promises generates the need for
them as necessary creators of acquired obligations.
There is widespread tendency to see all assumed obligations as
necessarily resulting from promises, but Atiyah could hardly be
more widely off the mark than when he writes: "To the lawyer at
least, it would seem clear that the only purpose of trying to decide
whether a statement is a promise is to decide whether the statement carries an obligation with it."1 To decide that a promise was
made is one thing, to decide that it ought to be kept is quite
another. Thus I may have promised to meet someone in London at a
particular time, but there is an unpredictable and unavoidable delay.
If I am within reach of a telephone I could be expected to phone the
promisee to tell him why I could not keep my promise, and I would
expect him to continue to believe that I made that promise to meet
him, for it is the fact that this promise was made that constitutes
my reason for phoning him. I did precisely what I ought to have
done if I took the means of transport that was likely to be most
efficient. Yet I did not do what I promised.
Atiyah's position is peculiarly hard to understand, for he goes
on to claim, surely correctly, that other statements, such as threats,
can give rise to obligations. But, if you conclude that a certain statement was a threat rather than a promise, and your only interest in
deciding that it was a promise was to decide that it created an
obligation, then in concluding that it was a threat rather than a
promise, you have only failed to establish that it gave rise to an
obligation. But, since Atiyah claims that both promises and threats
can give rise to obligations, it seems on the face of it strange to suggest that it can be of no interest to decide whether, in a particular
case, an obligation arose from a threat or a promise. Atiyah himself
discusses at some length how obligations can arise from threats in
cases of repudiation of contracts. Thus, in a case when A threatens
to abandon the contract unless B agrees to new terms, A may be
18. P. ATIYAH, supra note 5, at 174.
19. Atiyah, Promises and the Law of Contract, 88 MIND 410, 414 (July 1981).
It seems clear that he meant to include in the class of lawyers academic lawyers like
himself.
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bound by his threat if B explicitly accepts A's repudiation, or relies
on it. After B has taken A's threat seriously enough to act on it, B
will not be permitted to go back on his words (threat). B has a right
to take A's threat as a promise in cases of this kind. But most
threats cannot be characterized as promises. Excluded are all nonverbal threats (those not made by the use of symbols) and verbal
threats that do not invite reliance because they are not emphatic
enough. Atiyah's view seems to be that all concern with the meaning of words is a merely verbal exercise and therefore of no importance. He treats the distinction between threats and promises in this
way, and therefore fails to appreciate that verbal threats, unlike ordinary promises, do not rule out the possibility that you may change
your mind; only emphatic verbal threats may do this. But, when
they do, such threats are naturally characterized as promises.
One of the reasons for taking consideration to be the mark of a
contract has to do with the importance of contracts in business
transactions in which it can be reasonably assumed that the parties
to the contract are motivated by the desire for profit. The parties
could be depended upon to be serious only if they had something to
gain by the transaction. You sell present gain for a promise, or a
promise for a promise. In the latter case, consideration would come
in the form of loss of trust if one of the parties does not honour his
promise. This is a prudential motive. Further prudential motives are
provided by the law securing remedies to the innocent party at the
cost of the guilty one, thus diminishing, if not removing, the loss of
the plaintiff or the gain of the defendant. The reason moral
philosophers have paid so little attention to mutual promises of the
conditional kind I have just mentioned is that there is little mystery
about the legal or prudential source of the obligation. In the case of
mutual promises (executory contracts), each party makes a conditional promise and when one party fails to honour the agreement,
the other party clearly is absolved from the obligation, which was
conditional upon performance, or at least the serious will to perform.
But what puzzled philosophers was the source of a moral obligation to keep promises. How could one come to be morally bound to
perform an action simply because one said one would perform it?
This puzzle cannot be solved by showing that the promiser would be
sued or lose trust if he did not perform. To complain, as Atiyah
does,2" that philosophers have failed to see that the most common

20. For a discussion of this issue, characteristically contemptuous of the contribution of philosophers, see P. ATIYAH, supra note 5, at Chapter 6, 138, 142-43.
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reason for being absolved from the duty to keep a promise is that
the other party failed to keep his part of the bargain, totally misses
the point of the problem facing the moral philosopher in the case of
mutual promises. He wants to know why it is morally wrong not to
do what you promised to do. It is not difficult to see why nonperformance releases the other party from his firm obligation when
her/his promise was conditional and the condition is not met. Only if
the condition is met does non-performance constitute failure to do
what was promised.
I now want to give some further reasons against the claim that
one needs to appeal to promises to explain contractual obligations.
The obligation in each case must be sought in other values. Examination of impossible promises reveals, I believe, that they do not
necessitate the introduction of implicit promises. The problem arises
entirely from a faulty analysis of the nature of a promise. It is claimed
that one cannot make promises that it is impossible to keep. The
argument depends upon a premise that I have rejected, and it runs
in something like the following way: Promises essentially involve
placing oneself under an obligation (prima facie) to do what one
promises to do. But, ought implies can, and one cannot do the
impossible. Therefore, it is impossible to promise to do the impossible. This is of course, nonsense, unless what is promised is logically
impossible, self-contradictory or unintelligible for some other reason.
In MacRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Commission,21 the Court obviously came to the right decision in rejecting the plea of the seller's
offer of a non-existent oil tanker, on the ground that it was impossible to contract (promise) to sell a non-existent ship, and that the contract was therefore void. But is it necessary for one to say that the
sellers promised that the wreck existed, unless one is already committed to the view that contracts are promises? In the context, to
promise the right to salvage oil from an oil tanker, the location of
which is furthermore specified, is to promise explicitly the right to
real salvageable oil from a real tanker. There is no need at all to
postulate an implied promise. It seems most unnatural to say that
the existence of the tanker was promised, although it is clear that
an offer to sell the wreck on the understanding that it contains
salvageable oil entitles those to whom the offer is made to assume
that the oil is not non-existent oil and that the wreck is a real,
rather than a non-existent, wreck. We here have a case of what is
21. McRae v. Commonwealth Disposals Commission, 84 C.L.R. 377 (1951). See
discussion A. Honore, References to the Non-Existent, 68 PHIL. 302 (1971), and P.
ATIYAH. supra note 8, at 155.
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tacitly understood and consequently need not be promised. There is
no conceptual difficulty either about selling the non-existent or
about promising the impossible, though the seller and the promiser
cannot honour their commitments in such cases.
But, it is no less artificial to postulate a promise to explain the
obligation to pay a debt. Thus, Ian MacNeil, in discussing the transaction of buying gas, describes promise as, perhaps, a slightly hidden element, for ". . . either the tank is filled before payment or
after; in either case credit, and with it promise occurs ....the time
is so short that the failure to pay or the failure to deliver paid for
gasoline would be viewed as deliberate from the start, and hence a
theft, rather than a breach of promise initially intended to be kept.
(An implied promise is nevertheless present, at least in the mind of
the innocent party)."' There is an obvious sense in which, on my account, perfectly good sense can be made of what is implicitly promised. When a man promises to sell a tanker he may be implying a
promise to sell a ship, the context making it obvious that the tanker
is not a motor vehicle. But there is only one promise in this case; the
"implied promise" indicates only what we would be licensed to say
and expect to be the case on the basis of the promise made. In the
case of the tanker taking the form of an advertisement in a newspaper, the promise is still an overt symbolic act. But MacNeil's implied promise is quite different. It may exist only in the mind of the
innocent party. It is supposed to be there because to think that the
thief has incurred an obligation is, on his view, to think that he
made a promise. But the conventional rules governing our monetary
system are so firmly established that it is taken for granted as not
needing to be promised that even at self-serve gas stations, you are
incurring a debt by filling up your gas tank. Not only need the
culprit have made no overt promise to incur the obligation, he need
not even have had any "promise existing in his mind."
The strain in the relation between the concept of a promise, on
the one hand, and that of a contract, on the other, is evident when
you see Corbin maintaining that there is no difference in principle
between a contract made by an express symbolic act, and one implied by non-symbolic behaviour. The first, but only the first, can
constitute a promise, on my account. But, Corbin points out that
"parties who have made an express contract to be in effect one year
(or any other time) frequently proceed with performance after the
expiration of the year," and the courts may decide that the parties
22.

Macneil, Values in Contractual Relations (1981) (unpublished manuscript).
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have "agreed in fact" to renew the contract.23 Now, it may well be a
wise procedure to take the parties in a situation of this kind to be
agreeing tacitly to a renewal of the contract without promises being
exchanged, but, to insist that a tacit promise must be postulated to
explain the continued contractual obligation seems to me to be sheer
prejudice, and not in the least illuminating. It is much more natural
to say that the court presumes a tacit agreement in such cases. This
we can understand. But a tacit promise is too much like an "unexpressed promise," a strictly unintelligible expression.
If one looks at contracts "implied in law" the absence of a
promise is obvious. One of the examples Corbin gives is this: "A
finds B's house afire and his cattle starving and renders service and
incurs expense in saving and feeding them. In some states, B is
under a quasi-contractual duty of reimbursement."2 Corbin himself
has made the most appropriate comment here. He says, "While the
word 'assumpsit' literally means 'he promised,' it was easy for the
courts to create the fiction of a promise in these cases, to say that
the law implied a promise, and then to refuse all opportunity to the
defendant to deny it. The action of debt was older than assumpsit;
and in very many instances a debt existed without being either
created or accompanied by a promise to repay it."25
The paradox evident in Corbin's statement can be avoided.
There is no need to deny the right to claim truthfully that no promise was made. All that needs to be done is to give up the erroneous
view that the obligations in these cases arise from promises. It may
be claimed that to talk about promises in this way does no harm, if
one simply remembers that implicit and fictitious promises are not
really promises. But, such insensitivity to the dangers of abusing
words will not do. Fictitious promises may not be promises, but the
whole point of the exercise seems to lie in the classification of them
with promises. Since promises are essentially overt symbolic acts,
one does not want to give support to the view that there may be
promises belonging to a purely mental sphere, or a metaphysical
world in which fictitious promises dwell. After all, David Hume was
quite right to insist that promises are not private mental acts, but
overt symbolic acts, and Thomas Reid in calling them "social acts of
mind" is insisting upon their essentially public nature."
23.
24.

A. CORBIN. supra note 1, at 27.
Id. at 29.

25. Id.
26. See D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
(L. Selby-Bigge ed. 1888), and THE WORKS OF
Hamilton Bart eighth ed. 1895).
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In an apparent attempt to assimilate contracts to promises
Atiyah writes: "If promising is derived from the rules of a social
practice of promising, one might have thought that the answer to
these questions [whether one can promise present and past facts]
must be found in the rules of the practice, and the law of contract is
the nearest we have to a statement of those rules."27 If promises are
necessary for the creation of contractual obligations it seems to
follow that the law of contract partly consists in the rules of the
practice of promises. It would however leave out entirely legally
non-enforceable promises. But Atiyah himself rightly draws attention to the fact that certain contractual obligations do not seem to
need promises for their explanation. The examples he takes are the
already mentioned cases of a man entering a bus becoming liable to
the obligation to pay the fare, and of a man who orders a meal in a
restaurant thereby incurring the obligation to pay for it. In neither
case does the obligation seem to depend upon a promise. This is
stressed by Atiyah, who writes: "The lawyer explains these obligations by saying that there are implied promises." 8 But Atiyah
strongly suggests that he believes that this explanation is erroneous. He seems to agree with me that promises are not needed
here. Thus, he writes: "The concepts of property, of debt, and of
obligation antedate the concepts of promise and contract."' On this
view it seems odd indeed to claim that the law of contract is descriptive of the rules of the practice of promises. But Atiyah has a conjuring trick up his sleeve. He claims that the paradigm case of a
promise is the implicit promise. This would seem to mean that to
order a meal at a restaurant is a clearer or more typical case of
promising than an explicit promise to pay the bill on a certain day
because you forgot to take money with you to pay for your meal.
Surely this is nonsense, although it may well be more common for
obligations to be acquired by actions that lawyers describe as implying promises than by explicitly promising. This does nothing to
justify postulating implicit promises to account for pre-existing
obligations. There is no time here to enter into Atiyah's complex account of promises as consent and admissions, but I cannot see the
justification for claiming, for example, that promising to pay for the
consequences of an accident is an admission that you were responsible for it. Compassion may lead me to do this, and this in no sense
commits me to accept responsibility for the accident. To promise to
pay for the destruction caused by an arsonist is not to admit that

27.
28.
29.

P. ATIYAH, supra note 8, at 161.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 174.
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you are that arsonist. To consent to the terms of a contract is also
quite different from admitting that the terms are fair. You may not
be able to do better than come to an essentially unfair agreement."0
Freedom to enter contracts voluntarily has been closely
associated with individualism and competitive business. With increase in social welfare arrangements comes the realization that this
freedom can lead to undesirable results. Perhaps people need to be
protected against freely entering into contracts that are harmful to
them. The courts would not uphold a contract in which one person
promised to become a slave to another. Certain clauses limiting
responsibility may be prohibited by law and insurance firms may be
legally required to print certain clauses in prominent type that have
previously been hidden in the small print. It is a significant feature
of this development that recognition is given to the fact, stressed in
this paper, that when it comes to contracts and promises, the content is of central importance when the questions of responsibility
and liability are raised. The other important point is that the difference between a promise and a legal contract is highlighted. A
contract that is void because it is unconscionable or illegal never
was a contract, whatever promises may have been given by the parties with full knowledge of what they were doing. Only by
separating the question of the identifying features of contracts and
promises from the question of the obligation created by them can
these points be clearly made.
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL DECISIONS

Certain features of the difference between the concept of a
promise, on the one hand, and legal contract, on the other, can be illustrated by reference to the case of Gilbert Steel v. University
ConstructionLtd." The case can also serve to illustrate the practical
danger of concentrating on the promises that appear to have been
made, to the exclusion of other aspects of the behaviour of the protagonists in a contractual dispute.
30. Id. at Ch. 7. Atiyah thinks one can infer a change in the concept of a promise from changes observable in decisions by the courts in contract disputes. I think
this is erroneous although in playing down the importance of promises as basic sourses
of obligation, Atiyah's account has much in common with my own.
31. The description of the case is here grossly oversimplified. For illuminating
discussions of this case, see Reiter, Courts, Considerationsand Common Sense, supra
note 17, and also Reiter & Swan, Contracts and the Protection of Reasonable Expectations, and Swan, Considerationand Reasons for Enforcing Contracts, both in Studies
in Contract Law (B. Reiter & J. Swan eds. 1980).
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G. S. made a contract with U. C. to supply steel at a certain
price for the construction of apartment buildings. Before the first
building was completed, the parties met, and an oral agreement was
reached that the price be raised due to increase in the price of supplies of steel to G. S.. A written contract was drawn up, but it was
not signed by U. C., though sent to them. However, no protest was
made when the invoices showed the higher price and, what is more,
U. C. started to make payments in round sums, which in view of
later events, were clearly designed to leave a debt to G. S. when the
first building was completed. The judge did not accept the defense
that the verbal agreement had been given under duress, but ruled
against the plaintiff on the ground that there had been no consideration for the verbal agreement, and that consequently the plaintiff
had done no more than what he was obliged to do under the original
contract.
The judge asks, "Why should the defendant have given up
their protected position under the contract dated October 22, 1969?"
(Written contract). The appeal judges ask, "Where then was the
quid pro quo for the defendant's promise to pay more?". It appears
that the decision that there was lack of consideration is here due to
the notion that the defendant had no motive to enter a new contract
that was less advantageous than the one already entered into. For
this reason, the courts judged his promise not to be binding legally.
But, it was argued (by Mr. Morphy) that the facts gave rise to a
moral obligation. This was accepted by the trial judge who nevertheless failed to see this as a reason for finding the verbal promise
binding in law because "not every moral obligation involves a legal
duty, but every legal duty is founded on a moral obligation." 2 Of
course it is true that there are any number of moral obligations that
result from promises that are not enforceable by the courts. But
something is seriously wrong with the judge's claim that all legal
duty is founded on a moral obligation. If he were to follow this principle he should have decided in favour of the plaintiff, for after the
verbal agreement, the occurrence of which the judge accepted, G. S.
had no moral obligation to supply steel at the old price, and they
were given further reasons for considering themselves absolved
from this duty by the deliberately deceitful actions of U. C.. If G. S.
had a legal duty, and this was the judges verdict, it was certainly
not based upon a moral obligation in this case.
32. Gilbert Steel Ltd. v. University Construction Ltd., 36 D.L.R.3d 507 (1976)
(the trial judge quoting Lord Coleridge).
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I have argued that, as it turned out, it was easier for G. S. to
get out of its moral obligation than its legal obligation. The gap between the legal and the moral aspects of this case is further
demonstrated by the fact that, to quote Barry Reiter, "There would
certainly have been no difficulty had G. S. required a new written
contract under seal, before commencing deliveries after 1 March
1970 (the oral agreement). On the court's reasoning, there would
have been no difficulty had the Gilberts merely required a new written contract (even without the seal) expressly rescinding the October contract."' From a purely moral point of view a written promise would never be morally binding when the same oral promise
would not be binding at all. The written promise might give greater
security to the promisee, because it is less easy to get away with
breaking the promise. The evidence is more indelible, and this might
give the promisor an added prudential motive, but not a stronger
moral motive, to be as good as his word.
That the decision in G. S. v. U. C. was unjust was plain even to
the judge, who thought he was nevertheless forced to reach it as an
officer of the law. Barry Reiter, in criticizing the decision, undertakes to show both that the rule applied is not the law and that it
never was the law. His argument that the unjust decision could have
been avoided consistently with the law seems to me persuasive. But,
clearly, one cannot take it for granted that an application of legal
principles will always secure justice. Underlying Reiter's attitude is
great optimism. "The judges," we are told by him and John Swan,
"have an uncanny ability to arrive at proper decisions, decisions
that show a careful balance being struck between the factors that
must be considered even though the judge, any more than the horse
trader, cannot always make explicit the factors and reasoning process that led him to his decision."u If the decisions are the proper or
best decisions, all relevant values considered, this means that the
decisions must be morally acceptable because a decision that is not
morally acceptable is not acceptable at all. Nothing can make a decision acceptable if it is morally unacceptable. The highest court of appeal is the moral one. Although judges may be endowed with
superior moral sensitivities, it is only to be expected that they may
find it difficult at times to discover in legal precedents a morally acceptable story that will be seen to justify the best decision in a
novel case.

33.
34.

Reiter, Courts, Considerationsand Common Sense, supra note 17, at 452n.
Reiter & Swan, supra note 31, at 2-3.
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Barry Reiter has shown convincingly that, in the case of G. S.
v. U. C., the court could have come to the fairer decision of finding
for the plaintiff. I am not going to go over that ground again, but
certain observations about the alternatives that could have been
adopted may help the general purpose of this paper, which is to
downgrade the obligation to keep promises as a source of contractual obligation. Thus, if more attention is paid to the general
behaviour of the parties, apart from the situation when the contract
was made and the oral promises exchanged, it may become clearer
that unjust enrichment would have been an appropriate principle for
securing justice. Furthermore, it seems clear that whether a
"modification" of a contract should be treated as a new contract
depends upon the importance to the contracting parties of the
modification concerned. In a business contract, the price of the commodity sold is of the essence of the contract and it seems entirely
unreasonable to claim that an obligation to deliver at a lower price
would continue after a new agreement has been reached, with
respect to an increase in price: Of course the promisee must be protected against a unilateral decision to increase the price of the commodity, combined with the claim that the new price quoted rescinds
the former contract. But here the situation is quite different for,
although U. C. did not intend to be bound by the verbal agreement,
they deliberately behaved in such a way as to lead G. S. to believe
that they intended to pay the higher price. Seriousness of purpose
was amply (though fraudulently) indicated by U. C., and consideration was not needed for demonstrating such a purpose. It must be
some symbolic consideration that the judge deemed to be needed
here, for "the law is not concerned with whether the consideration
is adequate."35
The whole issue is made to hinge upon whether the promises
given verbally were given with consideration. But, could it not be
said that U. C., by their behaviour, implicitly promised to pay the
higher price by not protesting when it appeared on the invoices.
But, there would have been no more consideration for that implied
promise. To claim that the implied promise is the paradigm and
ought to be given precedence for that reason, is most implausible.
The judges were clearly right not to take U. C.'s immoral behaviour

35. P. ATIYAH, supra note 1, at 71. It seems to be an orthodoxy to treat consideration as symbolic rather than substantial. Thus, Freid, "The law is not at all
interested in the adequacy of the consideration." C. FRIED, supra note 4, at 29. But
there may be difficulties about deciding what can count as serious consideration. I
don't see at the moment how to go about seeking a solution to this problem.
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as an implicit promise. The crucially significant feature of the case is
the deceit evidenced by U. C.'s change of method of payment, and
this clearly cannot be represented as a promise of any kind. But U.
C.'s deceitful behaviour is immoral for the same reason as a deceitful promise and ought to have been given decisive weight. That it
was not given such weight appears to have been due to the
mistaken idea that the only thing that needs to be considered in
deciding a contract dispute of this kind is whether a promise of the
right kind had been broken.
The doctrine that all contractual obligations derive from a
promise can be saved only by extending the concept of promise
beyond its natural bounds. This is a most unsatisfactory procedure,
for the ordinary meaning of the term is always there ready to confuse the issue. The nature of promises remains unaffected by the
changes that may have occurred in the application of the law of contracts. This is not, of course, to say that the importance the person
in the street attaches to promises may not influence and be influenced by the. decisions of the Courts in contract cases.
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